Abstract
The presentation is about foundations of decisions under uncertainty. It defines rationality and argues that, contrary to the popular view within the economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. Justifications and implications of the terms above are discussed. Examples of axioms and representations are also presented.
About the speaker
Prof David Schmeidler received his PhD in Mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1969. He had been faculty of both Economics and Mathematics at the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently Professor Emeritus at Ohio State University and Tel Aviv University, and also Professor of Economics at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.
Prof Schmeidler's research interests in recent years have mainly dealt with the foundations of decisions under uncertainty. He has developed axiomatic theories of decision making when information or attitude toward it is modeled by nonadditive probability, by sets of prior probabilities, and by cases. Other recent research topics include foundational issues boarding on philosophy and sociology of social sciences, and issues in financial markets. He is also interested in functional analysis, cooperative and noncooperative games and other topics in microeconomics, including general equilibrium, implementation and economic equity.
Prof Schmeidler is a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and Fellow of the Econometric Society. He is also President of the Game Theory Society.
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The lecture is free and open to all. Seating is on a first-come, first-served basis.
HKUST Jockey Club Institute for Advanced Study
Enquiries ias@ust.hk / 2358 5912
http://ias.ust.hk
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